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Abstract. Faced with the present migrant crisis and the dismal record of Europe in protecting 
vulnerable refugees’ and migrants’ rights, what could be the view of the moral philosopher? 
The contrast between the principles enshrined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and the reality of present policies is shocking, but more scrutiny will show that it is the result of 
a larger trend towards an understanding of freedom mostly in economic terms, at a time when 
economists such as Amartya Sen have revised their approach to economic growth and pros-
perity, noting the central role played by a much richer conception of freedom. The paper will 
scrutinize these inconsistencies and the conception of the person from which they derive and 
will provide an alternative and more coherent moral vision that could strengthen the legitimacy 
of the European Charter, at a time of growing dissatisfaction and so- called democratic deficit. 
Such a vision could help reconnect the Charter with a conception of the human person as in 
need not solely of passive legal protection, but also of active promotion of her self- respect and 
capabilities, and of her aspiration to a valuable life.
Over thirty years ago, on August 19, 1989, citizens of central and eastern Europe 
under communist rule started to vote with their feet, crossing forbidden borders and 
flooding into the so- called free world. They hoped that a union of law- governed, 
prosperous countries, “founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities” (Art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union),1 
would welcome them and give them the support that they needed. Is the European 
Union still as attractive as it was in 1989? How do the so- called European freedoms 
stand in respect to these tremendous aspirations? Are the dignity, security, prosper-
ity, and legality taken for granted in the Union still holding in spite of recent histori-
cal and political developments? Are not many political, economic, and moral 
weaknesses still unfixed, threatening the very survival of the Union?
In 2015, as a result of armed conflicts, terrorism, and civil wars in Syria and Iraq, 
migrants from the Middle East started pouring through the southern borders of the 
1 The 2009 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty) states in its 
preamble that “the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, 
freedom, equality and solidarity.”
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European Union. The response of the Union and the detention camps on Lesbos or 
Samos, reminiscent of concentration camps, shed a sinister light on the promises cre-
ated by the so- called European freedoms. Limited in reality to European nationals, dis-
connected from universal human rights and freedoms, in particular the right to life and 
security, to respect for one’s dignity, they reveal a trend which I will describe not solely 
as an obvious return to protectionism and nationalism, but fundamentally as an under-
standing of freedom in mostly economic terms, a tendency towards the “commodifi-
cation” of freedom (Esping- Andersen 1990, 35– 7). This leads to access to freedoms and 
rights for non- EU migrants being evaluated mostly in terms of costs and benefits, that is 
to say, of their utility, rather than in terms of universal duties to fellow human beings. I 
suggest this trend echoes similar worrying developments concerning social policies and 
social rights for EU migrants that have led to “freedom of movement of persons increas-
ingly being seen as politically problematic, and most likely unsustainable; it has been re-
duced to just another form of ‘immigration’ like others, that must be subject to the same 
kinds of sovereign control, restriction and selectivity imposed on conventional forms of 
international migration from outside the EU” (Barbulescu and Favell 2020, 151).
How did that come about?
The main values and norms of the European Union, short of a constitution and 
its bill of rights, are enshrined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
2000 and the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 as well as in the European Convention on Human 
Rights of 1953. But different norms are also at work in the institutions and policies 
of the EU, namely, the famous “fourth freedom,” expressed in the Treaty of Rome 
of 1950 and omnipresent during the Brexit negotiations: freedom of movement for 
goods, services, capital, and labour (then enlarged to citizens). One cannot fail to be 
struck by a feeling of inconsistency and of conflicting strategies when one takes a 
closer look at such an extension from “goods” to “citizens,” which has proved highly 
problematic and leads to treating people as mere commodities.
My aim in this paper, as a political and moral philosopher, not a specialist of 
the EU, will be, firstly, to scrutinize these inconsistencies and the conception of the 
person from which they derive and, secondly, to provide an alternative and more 
coherent moral vision that could strengthen the legitimacy of the Charter, at a time 
of growing dissatisfaction and so- called democratic deficit, and could help reconnect 
it with a conception of the human person as in need not solely of passive legal pro-
tection, but also of active promotion of her self- respect and capabilities, and of her 
aspiration to a valuable life. Whereas, among economists, the realization that a strict 
focus on growth of GNP could be extremely limiting and detrimental has led to a 
new vision of the importance of freedom to measurements of wellbeing (Sen 1999, 
5), the Union seems to have regressed and adhered to a narrow focus on utilities, 
income, and wealth to justify its more recent immigration policies.
1. Freedom: A Conceptual Analysis
Let us start with a point of vocabulary. Freedom is not the same as liberty and, usu-
ally, constitutionalists and political philosophers talk of liberty, that is, the possibility 
to act, think, work and move around within the boundaries of the law according to 
the principle Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Liberties and rights are synony-
mous in a rule- based political context, with corresponding duties to abide by the law. 
Liberty is freedom within the law, the main questions being, of course, that of who 
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makes the law and establishes its boundaries and, equally importantly, of the many 
forms of boundaries and limitations other than lawful interference.
1.1. Freedom, Power, and Agency
Freedom, however, is a wider and more problematic concept that involves much 
more than the constraints of the law. It is usually defined as the possibility of “free 
choice” or “free will,” and, in its more extreme form, as “the ability to do as we 
please.” The problem arises, then, of the perception of what makes a choice really 
“free” and, here, we should follow Spinoza when, in Ethics, he warns us that imagin-
ing a constraint- free choice is as meaningless as when
[a] baby thinks that it freely seeks milk, an angry child that it freely seeks revenge, and a timid 
man that he freely seeks flight. Again, the drunken man believes that it is from the free decision 
of the mind that he says what he later, when sober, wishes he had not said. (Spinoza 2002, pt. 
III, proposition 2, scholium, p. 281)
This extreme view of freedom is nevertheless widely shared by libertarians, who 
claim that any interference with individuals’ ability “to do as they please” is poten-
tially destructive and an infringement of their sovereignty; any constraint imposed 
by duties and responsibilities towards others can all too easily lead to erasing “free 
choices,” according to the principle of the “slippery slope.”
This view is generally labelled as “negative” freedom (Berlin 1969),2 the absence 
of constraints or obstacles, or as “freedom from” limits and conditions. The focus is 
on choices among various outcomes, resources, and goods, whatever value they 
have, not on what has real worth for the person in question.3 This leads to envisioning 
“market freedoms” as the ultimate form of freedom in democracies, whatever the 
value of the choices in question, as long as people feel they are free to do as they 
please. As a consequence, in a consumerist context and a market economy, demo-
cratic freedom risks being devalued as the freedom to choose and vote for whatever 
programme or politician pleases most, typical of a mere majority- rule form of gov-
ernment with all its dangers (Tocqueville 2004; Mill 1977).
If, however, we reject this limiting conception of democratic freedom, and agree 
that freedom is not simply “the ability to do as we please,” the main task remains to 
define the necessary and sufficient conditions for effective human agency in contrast 
to this chimerical view. We need to connect freedom with agency, not simply with 
mere choices or possibilities. This is where Sen’s analysis is a real game changer, as it 
shows that rights and status are not sufficient conditions, even if they are necessary, 
for people to fully function and “do the things one has reason to value” (Sen 1999, 
18). The focus should be on agency itself, or on “functionings,” as Sen would say. It is 
important to understand and scrutinize both the scope and the limits of the “agency 
aspect” of individual freedom, be they seen as “subjective”— “internal,” personal, 
natural, such as health, gender, character, desires, intelligence— or as “objective”— 
“external,” contextual, cultural, political, economic, and social, such as rights, op-
portunities, income, education. (Note here that the two are of course inextricably 
2 “The defense of liberty consists in the ‘negative’ goal of warding off interference” (Berlin 1969, 127).
3 The analysis of “adaptive preferences” or of the adjustment of wants to possibilities has 
shown how easily choices can become alienated from what we have reason to value and has real 
worth for us, from what makes us act upon it (Elster 1983, 25).
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linked.) However, if these conditions allow for mere possibilities for agency, but we 
do not or cannot realize them because of other obstacles and limitations, then we 
cannot be free. Freedom is inseparable from existing conditions for agency: It is an 
“exercise” concept, not an “opportunity” concept (Taylor 1985). Freedom concerns 
agency, the power to act, and as such cannot be satisfied by mere possibilities, by a 
mere status and set of rights. It relies instead on multifaceted conditions for action, on 
policies and interventions that are able to prevent, lift, or minimize these limitations 
and obstacles— unlawful interferences being only a fraction of these. It measures a 
relationship between, on the one hand, cold “facts,” and, on the other, preferences, 
aims, aspirations, values, etc. The difficulty is that these conditions are constitutive 
of freedom itself. Freedom, in this sense, is ontologically a relation, never an absolute.
Only then does freedom cease to be an empty promise and becomes meaningful, 
thanks to the recognition of the link between freedom and agency, a link which is at 
the forefront in Amartya Sen’s definition of freedom as the “capability to lead the 
kind of lives we have reason to value” (Sen 1999, 285), to act according to one’s ends; 
and, as Charles Taylor (1985, 213) says, freedom so understood “involves essentially 
the exercising of control over one’s life.” This is why we often talk about “positive 
freedom” (Berlin 1969)4 or of “freedom to.” Freedom, in that sense, is connected to a 
certain conception of a person’s agency and power. Individuals are autonomous, ac-
tive, and able to choose and develop their own aims and values against political, so-
cial, and cultural conditions, but also to accept, when justified, certain responsibilities 
and limitations on the scope, means, and consequences of their actions.
As Rawls puts it, “citizens are free” in three respects: “they conceive of themselves 
and of one another as having the [...] moral power to form, revise, and rationally 
pursue a conception of the good” (Rawls 1993, 30; my emphasis); “they regard them-
selves as self- authenticating sources of valid claims” (ibid., 32); and they “are viewed 
as capable of taking responsibility for their ends” (ibid., 33).
Let us pause an instant and reflect on the consequences of this link between free-
dom and agency for migration. What does “freedom of movement” mean for mi-
grants? Is it really freedom, and in what sense? Did people freely “choose” to migrate 
after 1989 and the opening of western Europe to the previous Communist countries, 
or in 2015 in the middle of civil wars in the Middle East? Is it not highly hypocritical 
to talk about “free choice” for “freedom of movement” as if a choice was possible 
between poverty, war, or famine and prosperous and stable Europe? The iron law of 
survival, economic necessity, and security has prevailed and led to decisions forced 
upon people with no other choice but to flee dire living conditions. In that case, free 
choice is certainly an illusion, but we should recognize that what still exists is human 
agency, the positive power to act and to decide to go, “freedom to.”
1.2. Four European Traditions
Now, it is clear that our understanding of freedom varies according to the emphasis 
we put on the various obstacles as well as on the respective value of “freedom from” 
and “freedom to.” We can then draw on at least four traditions of thought to under-
stand the European vocabulary of freedom used in the Charter: liberal, in both the 
classical and social traditions of liberalism; republican; and socialist.
4 “The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the individual 
to be his own master” (Berlin 1969, 131).
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The classical liberal view defines freedom in individual and legal terms, as an 
“opportunity” concept and as noninterference or “freedom from,” the legal status 
opening up possibilities and choices that may or may not be made, depending on 
individual aptitudes and character. Civil rights are the first stage in the development 
of rights (Marshall 1950, 14) and they guarantee “the great principle of economy, that 
individuals are the best judges of their own interest” (Mill 1900, bk. V, chap. xi, § 12, 
p. 583). The removal of all unnecessary interference should be the aim of a free soci-
ety, as “the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good 
in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs” (Mill 1991, 
33). Here, as long as migrants respect the law and do no harm, they should be able 
to pursue their good in their own way, which puts the focus on the present unjust 
European legislation.
The republican view, in contrast, is an “exercise- based” conception that sees 
“real” choices as dependent on the struggle against excessive political power and 
domination (Pettit 1997). One cannot be free in an unfree and unequal state. Political 
liberties are the result of a conquest and have priority over personal liberties or the 
“liberties of the moderns” (Constant 1988). Noninterference is too often compatible 
with both political and socioeconomic inequalities and apathy, leading to abuse of 
power. As Rousseau wrote in The Social Contract: “There is peace in dungeons, but is 
that enough to make dungeons desirable?” (Rousseau 1968, bk., I, chap. 4, p. 54). For 
the republican tradition, for Spinoza for instance, freedom cannot be exercised on 
one’s own, but depends on political institutions (such as the republic) that guarantee 
political freedom: the “liberties of the ancients” (Constant 1988). Without political 
rights and the possibility to intervene in the public domain, migrants remain ostra-
cized in the nation- state which is the only locus of political struggle even in Europe 
today, the defence of migrants being left to private individuals or NGOs.
The social liberal view of the early twentieth century (for example, of the British 
Labour party), in contrast, goes beyond and tries to reconcile socioeconomic rights 
and legal and political protections, combining “freedom from” and “freedom to” in 
more socioeconomic terms, Mill himself being a representative of that kind of social 
liberalism in his Principles of Political Economy (1900) and his Chapters on Socialism 
(1967). I would like here to quote T. H. Green, who has perfectly formulated these 
four dimensions of freedom— individual, moral, political, and social:
Freedom is a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing and enjoy-
ing, and something that we do or enjoy in common with others. We mean by it a power which 
each man exercises through the help or security given him by his fellowmen and which he helps 
in turn to secure for them [...]. The mere removal of compulsion, the mere enabling of a man to 
do as he likes, is in itself no contribution to true freedom. (Green 1991, 21)
In liberal Europe, then, migrants should be granted specific civil, political, and socio-
economic rights in order to secure their “freedom from want [...] and fear” (as FDR 
put it in his 1941 state of the union address: see Roosevelt 2016, 21), and to help them 
realize their aims and integrate. The abject failure to make any progress on those 
counts shows how restricted the vision of liberalism is in liberal Europe!
The socialist view, finally, defines freedom as responsibility in social terms and 
leads to the concept of a social Europe, sharing social responsibilities for the welfare 
of its population. Without consideration for both social conditions and consequences 
and for social relations, individual agency is no freedom. To quote Karl Polanyi:
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The true significance of social freedom is based on the actual relation of one human to another. It 
forces this demand upon us through the double realization that on the one hand there is no human 
relation which is without social consequences and that on the other hand in society there is and there 
can be no existence, no power, no structure, no law that is not based on the behaviour of individual 
beings. For the Socialists, “to act freely” means to act in the consciousness of the fact that we 
have the responsibility for our part of human relationships— outside of which there is no social 
reality, that we must carry this responsibility. (Polanyi 2004)
This is where the very conception of social progress in Europe is put to the test, and 
where disagreements are at their strongest.
Let us conclude that, even with respect to these four traditions, European freedom 
is failing to provide a coherent view of all these four dimensions:
Agency: Agent X is free only if she can act and realize her objectives. Having op-
portunities is not enough. Freedom is an exercise concept.
Values: Aim Z ought to be worth it, both in itself— for otherwise the action wouldn’t 
take place— and in its means and consequences. Freedom is a moral concept and rests 
on a conception of the good, of what is seen as meaningful and valuable by the agent.
Power: Agent X is free if she is not subjected in arbitrary ways to the capricious 
will of another, but only to the rule of law. Freedom is a political and legal concept.
Solidarity: Agent X is dependent on the collaboration and solidarity of others. 
Freedom is a social concept.
2. The Kantian Roots of European Freedom
The problem, now, looking at the European Charter, is that these complex ambitions 
are disconnected, the mostly economic view of freedom as “freedom from” being 
dominant. Is it enough to define “freedom from” as solely “freedom from want,” 
or should we / could we not go beyond an ideal of sufficiency, and aim instead at 
a richer ideal of equal freedom for all to realize their aims, where “freedom from” 
and “freedom to” are inextricably connected, as in T. H. Green’s proposal that I just 
mentioned?
The idea is not simply to assist those who lose out through accident or misfortune (although 
this must be done), but instead to put all citizens in a position to manage their own affairs and 
to take part in social cooperation on a footing of mutual respect under appropriate equal con-
ditions. (Rawls 1999, xv)
This leads me to my main criticism that the list of “freedoms” included in European 
treaties, conventions, and charters shows no awareness of the tensions, or even of the 
contradictions, between socioeconomic freedoms, on the one hand, and personal, po-
litical, and cultural freedoms, on the other. The thinking simply appears to have been 
that free markets— for capital, goods, services, and labour (the latter becoming “citi-
zens” at the stroke of a pen!)— will lead to political freedom and democracy and that 
prosperity is the key to the Union and its success. There is an underlying belief at 
work in this list of freedoms that they can be unified under the overriding aim of 
peace through prosperity and economic growth, which was the exact ambition of the 
founding fathers of the EU. According to Montesquieu, free markets and the doux 
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commerce would bring prosperity and peace,5 even if the “commodification” of free-
doms risks destroying the possibility of free agency itself, making money and the 
bargaining power that it entails the main basis for the Union.
The root of the difficulties is the conception of persons implied in the European 
Charter, which I would qualify as utilitarian, contrasting it with the more Kantian 
vision of human freedom and dignity enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. One could stress similar tensions in President Roosevelt’s 1941 Four 
Freedoms speech— freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from wants, 
freedom from fear.6
Persons have a right to these freedoms in view of their moral personality, because, 
to use Kant’s formula, they are “ends,” not simply means or “things.” What makes us 
“persons or ends in themselves,” and not solely means, is the moral power to set ourselves 
conceptions of the good, and to construct plans of life accordingly. It is the capacity to lead 
a life, not simply to submit to nature, that defines our moral personality. Such an analysis 
should allow for a better sense of what freedom really means, as the American phi-
losopher Christine Korsgaard shows:
So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be “humanity” or “rational nature,” 
which he defines as the capacity to set an end [...]. We must regard ourselves as capable of con-
ferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our 
ends as good. But since “every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational 
ground which holds also for myself,” we must regard others as capable of conferring value by 
reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in 
itself thus involves making that person’s ends as far as possible your own [...]. For this reason, 
it is our duty to promote the happiness of others— the ends they choose [...]. The goodness of 
rationally chosen ends is a matter of the demands of practical reason rather than a matter of 
ontology. (Korsgaard 1996, 260– 1)
Realising this capability should be the aim of a free society, as these freedoms are 
necessary for the human person and her higher- order interests to develop, not only 
for her happiness or wellbeing. To deprive people of them is to treat them only as 
things or means, not as “ends in themselves.” Kant connects freedom with agency 
and practical reason, that is, the capacity to set oneself ends within the limits of rea-
son. This is what he means by freedom as autonomy. Whereas the emphasis in Kant 
is certainly on justifying universal norms, these norms are not derived from any 
given conception of the good, but originate in the capacity we have as free agents to 
synthetize our various experiences through time into a meaningful goal- directed 
whole— “my” experiences coupled with the recognition that this capacity defines our 
moral personality and our common humanity.7 Contrary to the utilitarian “container- 
like” view of the self, Kant saw human beings as active beings and as capable of set-
ting themselves goals and orientations through time.
5 Montesquieu wrote that “everywhere there are gentle mores, there is commerce and [...] ev-
erywhere there is commerce, there are gentle mores” (Montesquieu 1989, bk. 20, chap. 1, p. 338). 
And: “The natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace” (ibid., bk. 20, chap. 2, p. 338). Cf. 
Lebaron 2019.
6 The four freedoms were goals articulated by United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 
Monday, January 6, 1941. In an address known as the Four Freedoms speech (technically the 
1941 State of the Union address), he proposed four fundamental freedoms that people “every-
where in the world” ought to enjoy (see Roosevelt 2016).
7 I am grateful to Andreas Niederberger for his comments on this point.
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In order for the European list of ideal freedoms to make sense, then, they must be 
reconnected with the Kantian conception of persons, not the utilitarian one or the 
doux commerce (Montesquieu 2018, bk. XX, chap. 1) and l’intérêt bien entendu 
(Tocqueville 2012, tome III, pt. II, chaps. VIII and IX).8 As Karl Polanyi would have 
said, the choice is between a “market society” and a free democratic polity. Failing to 
do that leads to treating “migrants” not as human persons, but only as “things,” 
worthless commodities, “deprived of their normative authority” and even of “the 
right to have rights” to contest the decisions and the violence to which they may be 
subject (Andreas Niederberger, commenting on this article).
3. The “Commodification” of Freedom and the Erosion of Social Rights
One root of this treatment of migrants resides in what I would call the “commodifica-
tion” of freedoms and the collision between free markets and fundamental liberties. 
Here it is obvious that the aim of creating a unified Europe around the main values 
of utility- maximizing and prosperity has blinded the authors of the Charter to the 
dangers of a utilitarian conception of freedom.9
Utilitarianism may lead to sacrificing the rights of a minority if that increases the 
general or average well- being of the population. This is exemplified in the present 
treatment of non- EU migrants, who are seen not only as foreigners, but also as dan-
gerous and threatening “aliens,” with local politicians exploiting the fear of minority 
cultures and religions, widespread since 2001 and the “war on terror,” as well as 
the failure of multicultural policies in Europe to fully integrate ethnic minorities. 
Utilitarianism can justify sacrificing rights and freedoms for protecting the greater 
good and well- being of majorities. As the French philosopher Helvétius wrote in 
1758:
When a vessel is surprised by long calms, and famine has, with an imperious voice, commanded 
the mariners to draw lots for the unfortunate victim who is to serve as a repast to his companions, 
they kill him without remorse: this vessel is the emblem of a nation; every thing becomes lawful, 
and even virtuous, that procures the public safety. (Helvétius 1807, essay II, chap. VI, p. 63)10
For the greater good of the majorities, the figure of the right- less individual, drawn 
by Arendt is a necessary sacrifice.
8 Translated as “self- interest properly understood” in Tocqueville 2004, vol. 2, pt. II, chaps. 8 
and 9.
9 In a 1998 letter to Philippe Van Parijs on the European Union and global justice, John Rawls 
wrote: “One question the Europeans should ask themselves [...] is how far- reaching they want 
their union to be. [...] Isn’t there a conflict between a large free and open market comprising all 
of Europe and the individual nation- states? [...] The large open market including all of Europe 
is the aim of the large banks and the capitalist business class whose main goal is simply larger 
profit. The idea of economic growth, onwards and upwards, with no specific end in sight, fits 
this class perfectly. [...] The long- term result of this [...] is a civil society awash in a meaningless 
consumerism of some kind” (Van Parijs and Rawls 2003, 15). See Van Parijs’s reply in favour of 
the common market (Jean Monnet and Jacques Delors) (ibid., 19).
10 The French original: “Lorsqu’un vaisseau est surpris par de longs calmes et que la famine a, 
d’une voix impérieuse, commandé de tirer au sort la victime infortunée qui doit servir de pâture 
à ses compagnons, on l’égorge sans remords: ce vaisseau est l’emblème de chaque nation; tout 
devient légitime et même vertueux pour le salut public” (Helvétius 1988, discours II, ch. VI, pp. 
83– 4).
37
Ratio Juris, Vol. 34, No. 1 © (2021) The Authors. Ratio Juris published by the University of Bologna and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
European “Freedoms”: A Critical Analysis
At the same time, an increasingly older population in Europe will need an influx 
of young migrants, and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 
(2018) and the “New Pact on Migration and Asylum” (EC 2020) do not hesitate to 
draw a line between a desirable and undesirable flux of migrants.11 Utility is the 
dominant value that justifies European regulation and legislation, not justice and the 
protection of individual freedom.
Migration is obviously connected to economic hardship and unemployment and 
can be understood as an individual rational choice. However, it would be too sim-
plistic to ignore the role of the demands of the global economy and its own rationality 
to explain the pressures of migration. Labour markets, for instance, cannot be “free 
markets,” as people enter into them on very unequal bargaining terms. Far from 
being morally neutral, free markets are destroying the weaker parties to the bargain, 
if they are not regulated and constrained by social and economic policies. The needs 
of economic competition at a global level lead not only to huge displacements of 
workforce, but, more worryingly, to social and ethnic exclusions and expulsions that 
create populations which are rejected in their own country and end up being seen as 
useless elsewhere too (Sassen 2014). What does freedom of movement mean when it 
leads to the loss of educated elites through immigration that “freedom of movement 
for labour and citizens” has caused for many poor southern and eastern European 
countries or sub- Saharan Africa? Markets are certainly a central institution in any 
free and open society, and have been proved historically to make people free and also 
to make them rich, but they must be regulated by normative principles, or, following 
Karl Polanyi’s expression, they risk ending up creating a “market society” (Polanyi 
1944), where everything, in particular people, is for sale (Sandel 2012; Satz 2010), and 
where the losers are left to their own devices.
It would be useful here to check on the “de- commodification” score of the 
European Charter: How much do the European freedoms work toward treating peo-
ple as persons, not as simply workers or consumers (Esping- Andersen 1990, 49 and 
chap. 2)? This would shed a significant light on its policies towards migrants.
Let us take another example, that of the continuous restriction of social rights 
for EU migrants since the first waves of the 1990s (Barbulescu and Favell 2020) and 
its connection with anti- non- EU migration policies. The “hostile environment” to 
non- EU migration in European countries has been applied to EU migrants as well and 
has led to reshaping welfare entitlements and removing the welfare rights of EU job- 
seekers. The trend has been towards a highly selective offshore model for freedom of 
movement that contradicts the European principles of the Charter. Discrimination in 
the allocation of social rights and benefits to EU migrants is an obvious infringement 
of the principle of free movement. “Freedom of movement rights [have been] undone 
on all sides” (Barbulescu 2020, 158). The European Court of Justice, too, has played 
a role in restricting social rights and freedom of movement only to highly qualified 
workers, leading to a two- tier migration system. The migration crisis is definitely 
11 An illustration of this utilitarian view would be the European immigration policies concern-
ing medical personnel. Only Germany follows the 2010 WHO Global Code of Practice on the 
International Recruitment of Health Personnel and has refused to allow the immigration of 
medics and nurses originating from countries with acute shortages of these professions where 
basic needs risk not being met.
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embedded in values and policies that affect the whole of European freedom of move-
ment and make it unjust.
This trend towards the “commodification” of freedom is prevalent too in the 
evolution of social policies in Europe. The treatment of non- EU migrants is just one 
aspect of wider social policies and their understanding of the principle of freedom.
Since 2000, the Lisbon Treaty and the European Employment Strategy have en-
couraged European states to implement new social policies— called active workfare 
policies— that put the emphasis on people’s ability to function and that treat them as 
active members of society, not as inert recipients of social welfare. The social invest-
ment model treats people as precious “human capital,” valuable for the wider society 
and that, as such, should be invested in, not wasted. One could object to such a utili-
tarian approach that it values human agency mostly for its contribution to economic 
production, and that freedom is again seen as a means for economic progress and 
innovation, not as having intrinsic value (Sen 1999, 36). But it can also be seen in an-
other light as being more respectful of people’s agency, and, as a consequence, of 
their dignity.12 More importantly, the language of social investment policies can show 
how wasteful the present inhuman treatment of migrants is for the wider society. 
One could use this argument in order to remedy fully the negative contexts created 
by the single market and the single currency.13 Instead, unfortunately, the European 
devaluation of freedom has led to disregard of the “human capital” that migrants 
represent and to a situation where they end up being no longer employable or “use-
ful” and being excluded from the labour market because of their time spent in camps 
and the loss of skills that ensues (Agier 2018).
4. The “Privatization” of Freedom and the Erosion of Political Rights
The second and connected contradiction, and my second criticism, of the dominance 
of narrowly understood so- called “economic values” in the Charter is the “privati-
zation” of freedoms and the impoverishment of public life that such an interpreta-
tion generates. If the dominant accepted values are prosperity and economic growth, 
there is no space left for public debates on alternative views when other objectives 
such as justice, solidarity, and equality or the protection of the environment could be 
argued for. A dominant conception of the good such as utilitarianism crowds out the 
public space, making it impossible to freely exercise “public reason” (Rawls 1993). 
The dominance of the markets has weakened civic involvement in Europe (see the 
“yellow vests” crisis in France) and has undermined the appeal of public reason 
through the weakening of political freedoms (see the example of Brexit), which have 
a limited place and no priority in the Charter (Art. 12).
What is striking, in the present crisis, is the lack of any public voice to protest 
against the obvious infringement of fundamental principles. Neither politically nor 
legally has it been possible to build a wide movement of contestation of decisions 
12 On the difference between “human capital” theories and the “capability approach,” see Sen 
1990, 292– 7.
13 “The ambiguity of the Lisbon Strategy has allowed policy makers a selective use of and ref-
erence to the message of the European Employment Strategy, and a bias in favour of commodi-
fication and flexibility rather than social investment and security” (Morel, Palier, and Palme 
2012, 372).
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which, as I have shown, are part of a wider erosion of social rights that has con-
sequences for political rights and freedoms. The possibility to contest all these re-
strictions, exclusions, and mistreatments has been denied, and migrants are not only 
without rights, but also without a voice. Interestingly, the only movements of contes-
tation have been those of private individuals or NGOs (Agier 2018), of civil society, a 
fact that underscores the process of “privatization” of freedom in Europe.
My main worry is that, given that not all freedoms on the list are always com-
patible with each other and cannot all be protected at the same time— for example, 
freedom of religion (Art. 10) and the right to marry (Art. 9)— one needs a way to 
arbitrate among them, and, in a democracy, this can only be achieved through public 
deliberation, public reason, and justificatory processes that establish the priority of 
some basic liberties over others, such as property rights (Rawls 1993). This could 
explain the democratic deficit of the Union: There exists no vibrant European public 
space as a condition for realized agency and freedom.
Among the basic liberties in the Charter, political freedoms should have priority, 
as they are key to protecting other liberties through public and political engagement. 
As John Rawls writes, “social and economic inequalities in the background are ordi-
narily so large that those with greater wealth and position usually control political 
life and enact legislation and social policies that advance their interests” (Rawls 2001, 
148). Most people do not have the means to properly understand and exercise their 
rights, and these remain mostly formal possibilities. Political liberties are then crucial 
to guarantee equal access to legislative power and to protect the fairness of the po-
litical process. “The fair value of the political liberties ensures that citizens similarly 
gifted and motivated have roughly an equal chance of influencing government’s pol-
icy and of attaining positions of authority irrespective of their economic and social 
class” (Rawls 2001, 46; 1993, 358). “The guarantee of fair value for the political liber-
ties is one way in which justice as fairness tries to meet the objection that the basic 
liberties are merely formal” (Rawls 1993, 328). This necessitates that European insti-
tutions be in place to guarantee the effectiveness of political liberties in all various 
member states and that voices of contestation be properly heard.
Hopefully, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty and the Pact on Migration and Asylum initiated 
in July 2020 by European commissioners Margaritis Schinas and Ylva Johansson are 
opening up new perspectives towards the democratisation of European freedoms, 
especially with the creation of a European Citizens’ Initiative (2012), which could 
give a voice to criticisms and contestation of the present migration policies.
5. Postnational Freedom: A Failure? (European and National Identities 
and Their Differing Views on Freedoms)
The last contradiction stems from the origins of the Charter in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and its claims to universalism. I would like to call it, if 
I may, the failure of postnational freedoms against national identities. The European 
project was always ambiguous, fundamentally transnational or “postnational,” but 
also submitting to the resistance of national identities and interests. This was of 
course the contradiction that made any agreement on a European constitution im-
possible in the Maastricht Treaty.
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Where does the “European” in the European Charter stand? What is European 
about the Charter and not simply universal? Are European rights universal human 
rights and, in that case, how can they allow discrimination against non- EU migrants? 
Should European identity be understood in cosmopolitan terms or in terms of so- 
called “European values” with the risk of some nations/religions/cultures hijacking 
the European dimension as Christian, white, etc.? Defining “freedoms” in a vague 
and very general sense as a fundamental right obviously helps to compromise, but 
does not recognize the plurality of conceptions that divide national cultures and tra-
ditions. This lack of recognition is dangerously harmful, as the present developments 
in Europe show. Dissolving national identities into an abstract European model is not 
a satisfactory answer, as it leads to rejections and feeds nationalistic fervour.
Here some thinking about pluralism is needed. One would have hoped, following 
John Stuart Mill (1977, chap. XVI), that pluralism would have helped the European 
project and to weaken nationalism through the effects of freedom of movement, mo-
bility, contacts, and interdependencies (Van Parijs and Rawls 2003, 11), but this has 
not been the case, and the issue of a polyethnic European demos is still not resolved.
In contrast with abstract universalism, pluralism recognizes the diversity and 
tensions that exist among different historical traditions and values. It defines uni-
versality as “within reach,” as a goal, not as a given; and, more importantly, it values 
diversity and dialogue. Agreement is never a given but the result of the transforma-
tive and integrative power of the public sphere and of public debates. A consensus, 
not a compromise, should be possible once we abandon the illusions of unanimity 
or of overwhelming allegiance to “common” values. A good example of that sort of 
pluralism would be a debate on the various interpretations of European freedoms, on 
the value of its decommodification and of free public reason.
6. An Alternative Freedom- Based Moral Compass
We need to turn away from the dominance of utilitarian values and find another 
freedom- based moral compass which I would now like to sketch (Audard 2019).
6.1. Freedom, “Plans of Life,” and “Self- Realization” (John Rawls)
One distinctive feature of Rawls’s analysis of freedom is its developmental view of the 
person, referring to plans of life, not, as in utilitarianism, to present needs and instant 
satisfaction. “A person’s good is determined by what is for him the most rational 
long- term plan of life given reasonably favourable circumstances” (Rawls 1999, 79; my 
emphasis) and “a person may be regarded as a human life lived according to a plan,” 
not simply as a thing (ibid., 358).
Three ideas are of note here. To be rational is, first, to be able to plan and to sched-
ule activities and resources for the long term, envisaging the consequences of so 
doing: A temporal horizon is a necessary condition for rationality; hence the need 
for freedom. Instead, to take “men’s propensities and inclinations as given, whatever 
they are, and then seek the best way to fulfil them” is a mistake concerning the very 
nature of rationality (Rawls 1999, 27). Second, to be rational is to be capable of using 
the means necessary to promote one’s ends, and thus to project oneself in the future 
within a temporal horizon. “Rational individuals, whatever else they want, desire 
certain things as prerequisites for carrying out their plans of life” (ibid., 348). Taking 
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interests as given without any consideration for the ends pursued is also a mistake in 
that second sense. Thirdly, and as a consequence, a degree of freedom to choose and 
rank satisfactions is necessary for rationality. To ignore that is another mistake lead-
ing to the familiar dilemmas of interpersonal comparisons of welfare. Defining the 
good in developmental terms or plans of life allows interpersonal comparisons not of 
satisfaction— which is impossible— but of the means to promote satisfaction. What is 
compared are not subjective states of mind or satisfactions, but “things which it is as-
sumed they all normally need to carry out their plans” (ibid., 81). A conception of the 
person as a developing being, capable of choosing, planning, and adapting resources 
for its own ends, is implied here.
This conception is reinforced when Rawls analyses the temporal sequence in 
which our activities are carried out and the role of deliberative rationality in properly 
organizing this sequence of activities. For long- term plans, the principle of inclu-
siveness is added to the familiar principles of rational choice: Human beings have 
a higher- order interest in following the principle of inclusiveness, stating that the 
more inclusive plan is to be preferred; rationality means “preferring, other things 
equal, the greater means for realizing our aims and the development of wider and 
more varied interests” (Rawls 1999, 363). This is where Rawls introduces the notion 
of self- development as self- realization: “human beings enjoy the exercise of their real-
ized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and [...] this enjoyment increases the 
more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity” (ibid., 364). This leads 
to rejecting the view that our interests are fixed. As a consequence, the principles of 
rational choice, in particular that of maximization, are not sufficient for ranking our 
plans of life. Instead, Rawls moves towards a fuller description of rationality in the 
face of long- term decisions. The principle of responsibility to self is derived naturally 
from the idea of a plan of life: “a rational individual is always to act so that he need 
never blame himself no matter how his plans finally work out” (ibid., 370– 1). “Acting 
with deliberative rationality can only insure that [...] we are responsible to ourselves 
as one person over time. [...] One who rejects equally the claims of his future self and the 
interests of others is not only irresponsible with respect to them but in regard to his 
own person as well. [...] The principle of responsibility to self resembles a principle of 
right” (ibid., 371; my emphasis).
From the idea of long- term planning, Rawls now moves to the idea of a develop-
ing self, striving to implement its plans and getting pleasure from their realization. As 
he puts it, according to the Aristotelian principle, “human beings enjoy the exercise 
of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities)” (ibid., 364) and “we are 
led to expect even greater satisfaction once we acquire a greater repertoire of skills” 
(ibid., 375). The more complex activities give even more pleasure over time, and a 
companion principle states the social interdependency of rational plans of life as others 
confirm and take pleasure in what we do. Our nature as self- developing beings and 
the type of satisfaction we gain from that development are dependent on others’ 
validation and reciprocity and on fair and just social conditions. My conclusion, at 
this stage, is that the shift to a long- term conception of our ends combined with the 
Aristotelian principle yields a better understanding of the connection between self- 
development and freedom.
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6.2. Freedoms as “Capabilities” (Amartya Sen)
Amartya Sen’s critique of rational choice theory is another source of inspiration for a 
similar understanding of the person as a developing being. In Rationality and Freedom 
(Sen 2002) as in The Idea of Justice (Sen 2009), he rejects the “extremely limited under-
standing of reason and rationality” (Sen 2009, 179) in favour of a distinction between, 
on the one hand, having “reason to choose” something (ibid., 180) as a capacity to 
project ends in a temporal horizon, and, on the other hand, “what would be rational 
for us to choose” (ibid.) at a certain point in time. The main argument for “real” 
freedom here is the ability to sustain the choice after scrutiny, that is, the time- relevant 
conception of rationality. But it is mostly in Sen’s interpretation of freedom as a com-
ponent of human wellbeing that we find the link with self- development (Sen 1999). 
The “process of choice itself” is significant (Sen 2009, 228; italics in the original), and 
“individual advantage is judged [...] by a person’s capability to do things he or she 
has reason to value” (ibid., 231). “The capability approach focuses on human life, and 
not just on some detached objects of convenience, such as incomes or commodities 
that a person may possess” (ibid., 233). Like Rawls and against resource- based or 
utility- based conceptions of the good, Sen is looking for a freedom- based approach, 
a way of understanding social justice in terms of the treatment of persons, not solely 
the distribution of goods. The developmental conception of persons is the answer to 
this concern for justice, which is perfectly expressed by Elizabeth Anderson, as justice 
should be considered “as a relationship among people rather than merely as a pat-
tern in the distribution of divisible goods” (Anderson 1999, 336): “injustices may be 
better remedied by changing social norms and the structure of public goods than by 
redistributing resources” (ibid.).
7. Conclusion
What is at stake, really, in my opinion, is that the economic conception of the per-
son dominates the liberal view of freedoms in the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and that this is damaging the credibility of the Charter that can be seen in the 
end as promoting economic liberalism and free markets (mere opportunities) at the 
cost of moral individual self- realization and autonomy (“real” freedom), of a vibrant 
public sphere (free public reason), and of a pluralistic view of European identity.
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